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"Fining Drug Offenders: Who Pays?"
Abstract:
The heavy reliance upon law enforcement to control drug abuse has
placed growing strains on prison capacity and corrections budgets. This
has prompted a search for alternatives to incarceration for some drug
offenders. One alternative is a fine, either alone or in conjunction with
another penalty, e.g., probation or shorter incarceration.
However, fines are not an effective punishment unless they can be
enforced. Such evidence as exists suggests that many drug fines are not
paid in full and some are not paid at all. Consequently, sentencing policy
could be better informed if the determinants of fine payment were known
before a sentencing decision was made. This paper develops a theoretical
framework for the determinants of fine payment and then tests this
framework with a sample of 1,970 federal drug offenders sanctioned at least
in part with a fine. The framework includes three broad concepts: Ability
to Pay, Willingness to Pay, and Enforcement Effort. Each of these concepts
is measured by a set of variables and the complete model is tested using
multiple regression. The results give strong support to the model in terms
of predicted signs and statistical significance. However, most of the
explained variance is from policy controlled variables.
The primary conclusion of this study is that if fines are to be used to
replace incarceration, at least marginally, payment of the fine need not be
a barrier to this change, provided that fine sentencing takes proper
account of the relevant variables. When these variables indicate that a
fine of a size sufficient to constitute a just penalty will not be paid,
then community service or incarceration should be considered as an
alternative sentence.

I Background:
Over the last three decades the economic and social costs of illicit
drug use has continuously increased. A significant portion is criminal
justice system expenditures from enforcing our drug laws. In a period of
severe budgetary constraints a strategy sanctioning drug offenders with
incarceration raises serious economic problems. The available data on drug
offenders, even allowing for substantial error, produce numbers that are
daunting when considered seriously as an enforcement target. For example,
the number of cocaine users is estimated by the U.S. Attorney General to be
comprised of two to three million addicts plus about six million once a
month users . Another source estimates the number of marijuana users at
around 20 million . Conseguently, sanctioning offenders with
incarceration would add to the already serious budgetary deficit and/or
increase the pressures on a prison system that has been characterized as
being out of control .
However, the Bush Administration strategy envisions minimizing these
pressures by increased use of monetary fines, both criminal and civil for
users . The use of civil fines is a completely new initiative and
implementation has only recently started, but this promises to raise both
practical and legal issues 5 6 .
1 U.S.Attorney General, (August, 1989),p. 7
2 Reuter and Kleiman, (1986),p. 292
3 Blumstein (1988)
4 U.S. President,(1989), p. 63
5 U.S. Attorney General, (December 1989), p. 51206
6Cloud,(1989)p. 809
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provides strong sanctions for simple
drug possession offenses in the form of mandatory minimum fines with an
additional possibility of prison time. Persons convicted of a simple
possession offense with no prior drug-related convictions must be fined noS
less than $1,000 and may also be sentenced to not more than one year in
prison. Persons who have one prior, final federal or state drug-related
conviction must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of
15 days (up to a maximum of two years) and must be fined not less than
$2,500. Persons who have two or more prior, final drug-related convictions
must be sentenced to a minimum of 90 days in prison ( up to a maximum of
three years) and must be fined not less than $5,000 .
Replacing incarceration at the margin with fines is an attractive
policy provided that these fines can be enforced at reasonable costs and
that they have a deterrent effect. If fine enforcement is weak, this
policy initiative will become yet one more example of shooting blanks in
the War On Drugs. Consequently, it is crucial that all of the relevant
issues related to the use of fines for sanctioning users be analyzed.
It is important to note that this new policy on the use of drug fines
is being introduced notwithstanding an almost complete absence of a body of
knowledge which addresses most of the central questions:
o
o
What is the current enforcement success — percent actually
collected —of fines for drug offenses?
What are the most important determinants of drug fine collection
success ?
7 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 removed ceilings on mandatory fines that were enacted by The Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 providing further scope for punitive fines.
° What resources are needed to achieve a satisfactory enforcement
success for drug fines?
° What is the recidivism rate for drug offenses when sanctioned by
a fine?
° What enforcement techniques are the most successful?
° What role should drug fines have in overall sentencing policy
relative to drug treatment, relative to incarceration, relative
to community service?
The published scholarly research analyzing drug fine enforcement success
Q
in the United States is very limited . However, the Vera Institute has
published a valuable series of studies but dealing with fine use for all
criminal offenses, court administration of fines, and fine policy issues .
This study addresses the first two issues listed above using a sample of
drug offense cases taken from the Federal District Courts. The goal is to
explain the variation in fine collection success for drug offenses.
Section II explains the theoretical framework that guided the selection of
variables included in the regression analysis; Section III describes the
data used in the analysis, Section IV reports the results of the analysis
and Section V contains the conclusions of the study.
II Theoretical Framework;
8 See Cole, 1989 for a study of innovations in fine collection and Gillespie( 1988-89) for a study of fine
collection success.
9 Hillsman, Sally T. et.al.,(1988) and the references cited therein for a complete bibliography of the
literature dealing with fine issues; also the symposium on Fines and Fine Administration in The Justice
System Journal . 13:Spring 1988.
The focus of this study is fine enforcement success as measured by the
percent of fine paid at the time the offender was released from the
criminal justice system, end of parole or probation. Fine enforcement
success is assumed to be determined by three broad concepts; taken ^
together these concepts encompass all operative factors which determine
fine enforcement success for an individual. We assume that these concepts
operate independently. These concepts are: (i) Ability To Pay and (ii)
Willingness To Pay (iii) Enforcement Effort by the criminal justice system.
The rational for each concept and the specific variables use to measure it
are explained next.
A. Ability to Pay:
Ability to pay is captured in part by economic variables descriptive of
the individuals financial condition. These would included, after-tax
income
,
net worth, and minimum non-discretionary expenditures, e.g., food,
shelter, medical expenses, etc.. The contribution of financial condition
to ability to pay must be evaluated in relation to the size of the fine
imposed as does the Swedish 'dayfine' concept. In Swedish law fines are
explicitly specified in terms of 'dayfines' not absolute monetary values.
One dayfine is roughly one day of discretionary income. After the sentence
has been given in dayfines, the offender's income is used to convert the
sentence to a monetary fine. We use this process in reverse; the fine and
offenders income are used to compute the dayfine equivalent.
In addition to dayfines we use two additional variables to measure an
offender's ability to pay.
Number of Dayfines : The fine and reported average monthly income are
transformed into a number of dayfines [Dayfines= (Fine/Monthly Salary) *30]
.
The larger the number of dayfines, the smaller the predicted ability to
pay. To the extent that reported income is either incorrectly reported or
that discretionary income varies significantly across individuals with the
) same reported income, this proxy measure will incorporate an error. Since
many of the offenders in the sample have been convicted for drug dealing,
manufacture, or importing it is reasonable to infer that their reported
income and net worth will be under reported causing the computed dayfines
to systematically under estimate ability to pay.
In order to capture any non-linearity in the effect of dayfines on
ability to pay, dayfines were transformed into size categories and each
category assigned a dummy variable with a value of one assigned to the
category in which the number of dayfines fell. The lowest category was
omitted from the equation; its effect is implicitly incorporated into the
intercept term. The categories used were:
Dummy
Variable : Dayfine range :
DDAYFINO 1-25 — omitted category.
DDAYFIN1 26-50
DDAYFIN2 51 - 100
DDAYFIN3 101 - 150
DDAYFIN4 151 - 200
DDAYFIN5 201 - 3 00
DDAYFIN6 301 - 4 00
DDAYFIN7 401 - 500
DDAYFIN8 501 - 1000
DDAYFIN9 > 1001
Mandatory drug treatment: In some cases the offender's sentence
included mandatory participation in a drug treatment program. It is
w assumed that such a condition would be imposed only if the offender was
suffering from severe drug dependence. Such dependence would impact
adversely on an individuals income earning capacity and thus reduce their
ability to pay a fine. However, if the treatment program were effective,
earning capacity would be improved but most likely only in the longer term.
A dummy variable is assigned the value of one if the offender was reguired J
to participate in drug treatment. The sign will indicate whether the a
effect of past drug dependence dominates any positive effect of drug
treatment on fine payment during the period of supervision.
Employment History: Data are available on the number of months the
offender was employed during the 12 months prior to the offense. This is
transformed into a dummy variable which is assigned the value of one if the
offender was employed for nine or more months during this 12 month period.
The predicted sign of this variable is positive.
B. Willingness to Pay;
The second concept central to the analysis, willingness to pay, is
conceptually more complex than ability to pay. Willingness to pay includes
both an offenders value system and the offender's opportunity cost of not
paying the fine. Willingness to pay a fine may differ across offenders,
given the same ability to pay and the same enforcement effort. To the
extent that the offender holds values that significantly differ from the
established social order or feels oppressed by society, e.g. racial or
political oppression, other things equal, he will have little willingness
to pay although sufficient enforcement effort may still compel payment.
Even if the offender identifies in general with the social order, he may
feel it is unjust to impose sanctions for the instant offense, e.g. simple
possession of marijuana or that the size of the sanction is unjust and for
this reason lack a willingness to pay. (
The opportunity cost of not paying a fine includes the social and
economic costs of prolonged involvement with the criminal justice system.
It is hypothesized that drug offenders with high social and licit economic
status will suffer costs that continue as long as they are actively
involved the criminal justice system. They can shorten this involvement,
) e.g. early release from probation, if they comply promptly with all
conditions of probation including paying any fine. The predicted sign is
positive.
An offenders willingness to pay is measured by the following variables.
Age of the offender . The widespread use of illicit drugs is a
relatively recent social phenomena. There clearly appears to more
tolerance of illicit drug use by younger generations than by older
generations, that is younger offenders are less likely to view drug
offenses as a crime in a moral sense. If this difference in values is
strong, younger offenders will be less willing to pay and the age variable
should be significantly positive.
Race of the offender: If members of racial minorities feel that they
are the victims of racial prejudice they will not see the existing social
order as supporting their interests. Consequently, the opportunity costs
of non-compliance with any sanction will be lower than that for a white
member of society. This should reduce their willingness to pay a fine.
The race of the offender is introduced into the analysis by a dummy
variable which is assigned a value of 1 if the offender is non-white and a
zero otherwise.
Number of prior drug offenses : A history of illicit drug use indicates
that the offender has not been dissuaded from use by sanctioning. We
k
W interpret this to mean the offender will have a low willingness to pay.
However, offenders with prior records may be subject to greater enforcement
pressure than first offenders. Consequently, the predicted sign of this is
ambiguous.
.
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Education ; The more formal education an offender has, the more costly,
in terms of employment opportunities, is prolonged involvement with the
criminal justice system. The threat of imprisonment or even a probation
violation for non-payment of a fine would have significant opportunity ^*
costs for offenders with high educational attainment. Consequently, the
higher the level of educational attainment the more likely a fine will be
paid for any given level of ability to pay. Educational attainment is
measured in terms of a dummy variable. The variable is assigned a value of
1 if the offender has is college graduate, a zero otherwise. About 14% of
offenders in the sample have a bachelor or higher college degree.
Type of Drug Offense : The drug offenses in the sample are one of four
types: importing, dealing, manufacturing, on possession only. It is
assumed that those involved in supplying drugs do so in full knowledge that
this activity is criminal. Consequently, it is assumed that their
willingness to pay would be much less than an offender convicted of only
possession without intent to distribute. A dummy variable is defined to
distinguish drug dealing offenses from drug possession for use only; it is
assigned a value of 1 if the offense was drug use and zero otherwise.
However, individuals convicted of drug dealing may be subjected to greater
enforcement pressure than those convicted only of possession.
Consequently, the predicted sign of this variable is theoretically
ambiguous.
C. Enforcement Effort:
The third concept used to organize the analysis is the post sentencing v
enforcement actions of the criminal justice system. The authorities can be |
expected to 'produce' more enforcement success the more resources devoted
11
to enforcement and the more efficient the technology used, e.g., the
available legal powers for enforcement.
J Evidence from congressional hearings suggests that there has been a
problem in the federal district courts both with the administration of the
enforcement efforts and the available technology — legal powers.
Recognition of both problems resulted in the passage of the Fine
Enforcement Act of 1984 . This act sought to both clarify the assignment
of institutional responsibility for fine enforcement between the federal
courts and the Department of Justice and to provide greater legal powers to
enforce payment. The most powerful enforcement tool — the threat of
incarceration— has been vitiated by decisions of the Supreme Court. In
effect, incarceration is only possible if it can be proved that the failure
to pay was willful, i.e., that the ability to pay exists. For many
offenders, such proof would be difficult to establish in court.
Consequently, the costs to the criminal justice system of making a threat
of incarceration credible is so high as to precludes its routine use; other
tools must be used.
The literature on other fine enforcement methods and their
effectiveness is very limited. However, the literature does suggest that
in many jurisdictions there may be unexploited opportunities to increase
fine enforcement at relatively small cost. Although every U.S. attorney's
office and every district court are bound by the same federal laws, there
are still be opportunities for differential enforcement efforts within
^districts. The allocation of resources — budget— among fine enforcement
or other prosecution activities may vary among districts. Also, the
enforcement efficiency, given identical resources, may differ among the
districts. However, the variables available in the data set offer only
12
limited means of measuring differential enforcement effort among districts.
Only one crude effort could be made to capture such inter-district
differences. ^
Enforcement effort differs between cases even within a district. ™
Indeed enforcement effort is likely to show greater variation between cases
within a district than between districts. All offenders in the sample were
under post-sentencing supervision; one goal of this supervision would be
fine enforcement. There were two forms of supervision — probation and
parole. Both the length of supervision and type of supervision were used as
proxies for fine enforcement effort.
The effect of enforcement effort is captured by the following specific
variables.
Size of district drug fine caseload: Cases in the sample originated in
86 districts. However, the distribution was asymmetric. The four
districts with the largest number of cases accounted for 22% of all cases.
A dummy variable was created to identify these "big caseload districts".
It was assigned a value of 1 if the case originated in these four districts
and a zero otherwise. No a priori prediction as to the expected sign of
this variable is possible. Size of caseload could affect enforcement
effort in opposing ways. Large case loads could result in lower (or
higher) levels of resources per case and thus lower (increase) enforcement
success. There could also be economies of scale in the technology which
could lead to improved enforcement success as caseload increased even
though the average amount of resources per case declined.
I
Length of supervision: Because the impact of the length of supervision J
could be non-linear it was introduced through two dummy variables. One
dummy was assigned the value one if the supervision periods between 13 and
13
24 months and a zero value otherwise. A second dummy variable was assigned
the value of one for periods of 2 5 or more months and a zero value
) otherwise. The estimates for each of these two dummy variables are to be
interpreted as showing the effect on fine enforcement success of either
period relative to a supervision period of 1 to 12 months.
Type of supervision: A dummy variable was assigned a value of one if
the type of supervision was probation and a zero otherwise. No a priori
sign is predicted for this variable.
Prison Term ; Over half of the sentences included a prison term in
addition to a fine. A prison term was introduced into the model through a
dummy variable which was assigned the value of one if the sentence included
a prison term. In theory the effects of a prison term on fine enforcement
success could operate through all three of the mechanisms in the framework.
A prison term could reduce the offender's ability to pay the fine; it could
also reduce an offender's willingness to pay because the prison term has
reduced the opportunity cost of non-payment. Finally, the prison term
would make the offender less responsive to enforcement efforts. All three
effects operate in the same way — to reduce the predicted amount of fine
that will be collected — consequently the predicted sign for this variable
is negative.
The hypothesized effect of the independent variables on fine
enforcement success and the operative processes are summarized in Table 1
below:
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Table 1
Variable:
Predicted Effect of Variable Through: Overall
Ability Willingness Enforcement Predicted
to Pay: to Pay: Effort: Sign:
Ability to Pay:
Number of Dayfines
Drug Treatment
Employment History
(-)
7
(+)
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
(-)
7
(+)
Willingness to Pay:
Age nil
Non-White Race nil
Prior Drug Offense nil
Education Level nil
Drug Dealing ( + )
Enforcement Effort:
Fine Case Load nil
Length of Supervision nil
Type of Supervision nil
Prison Term (-)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(-)
nil
nil
nil
(-)
nil
nil
( + )
( + )
( + )
( + )
(?)
(-)
( + )
(-)
7
(+)
( + )
(?)
(-)
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III The Data;
The cases are drawn from federal district court cases where supervision
began during the period 1983 to 1988. The cases used in the analysis were
selected using the following criteria:
(i) The most serious charge was a drug offense: importing,
dealing, manufacturing, or possession,
(ii) The offense was either a felony or serious misdemeanor
(iii) A fine of at least $500 was part of the sentence,
(iv) Supervision, probation or parole, was part of the
sentence and the period of supervision was completed,
(v) The reported average monthly salary during the 12 months
prior to sentencing was greater than zero.
The decision to omit cases with fines less than $500 was based on the
assumption that the fine should not be trivial. Limiting the cases to
those where supervision was imposed was necessary because of data
limitations. The database did not contain any post sentencing data except
for cases involving supervision. Consequently, information on the amount
of the fine that was paid was available only for supervision cases. At the
end of supervision, the total amount paid was entered into the database.
^If the monthly salary were zero, the number of dayfines would be
indeterminate. These criteria produced a sample of 2,002 cases; however,
missing data reduced this to a useable sample of 1,970 cases.
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The variables used in the analysis and related summary statistics are
given in Table 2 . The table gives the average percent of fine paid within
the groups used in the regression analysis. For the sample the average
percent of the fine paid was 62%. However, this average conceals a wide
variation in percent paid among sub groups. For example, only 22% of fines
which converted to 1,000 or more dayfines. At the other extreme, the aveage
payment was 83% for fines equivalent to dayfines in the range of 1 to 25.
In principle, all of the variables contribute to the amount paid in a given
case. To evaluate their contributions, holding all other factors constant,
multiple regression analysis was used. We now turn to the results of this
analysis.
c
I
Table 2
Variables and Sample Statistics
17
Variable/Category :
Total Sample
DDAYFINO Dayfines
DDAYFIN1 Dayfines
DDAYFIN2 Dayfines
DDAYFIN3 Dayfines
DDAYFIN4 Dayfines
DDAYFIN5 Dayfines
DDAYFIN6 Dayfines
DDAYFIN7 Dayfines
DDAYFIN8 Dayfines
DDAYFIN9 Dayfines
DTREATDR
>0 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 150
151 - 200
201 - 300
300 - 400
401 - 500
501 - 1000
> 1000
=1 If Drug Abuse Treatment Was Required
DBEGEMPL =1 If Employed 4 Or More Months In 12 Mo
AGE Age In Years When Supervision Started.
DRACE =1 If Race Is Non-white
DPRDRUG =1 If One Of More Prior Drug Offenses
DDROFUSE =1 If Offense Was Drug Use Only
DBEGEDLV =1 If College Graduate
DBIGDIST =1 If District Had Big Drug Case Load
DSUPV0 =1 If 1 - 12 Months Supervision
DSUPV1 =1 If 13 - 24 Months Supervision
DSUPV2 =1 If 2 5 Or More Months Supervision
DPROBAT =1 If Supervision Type Was Probation
DPRIS =1 If Sentence Included Prison Term
Average % Of
% Paid N Sample
62% 1 ,970 100%
83% 460 23%
70% 420 21%
64% 356 18%
52% 220 11%
44% 104 5%
46% 163 8%
50% 54 3%
35% 58 3%
30% 74 4%
22% 55 3%
62% 283 14%
i 63% 1 ,804 91%
37 yrs==mear i 100%
51% 477 24%
56% 271 13%
77% 465 24%
71% 277 14%
58% 442 22%
51% 622 32%
61% 612 31%
74% 710 36%
81% 1 ,095 56%6
48% 1 ,133 58%
IV Statistical Results:
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 2. The
estimates for dummy variables are the increase or decrease in the predicted
percent of fine paid produced by the characteristic when the dummy variable
has a value of one. As an example, consider an offender age 2 whose fine
| and monthly income converted to 15 dayfines, who was sentenced to a prison
term and six months parole supervision. His characteristics caused all
other dummy variables to be zero. The equation predicts that he will pay
44.48% (=46. 99+. 23x10-4. 81) of his fine. However, if he was not sentenced
18
to prison but only to 6 months probation supervision, his predicted payment
would be 77.38% (=46 . 99+. 23x10+28 . 09)
.
iThe ability to pay variables all have the predicted sign and all but the
one are strongly statistically significant. It should be noted that there™
was some ambiguity as to the predicted sign for mandatory drug treatment.
The results support the conjecture that drug dependence, as evidenced by
mandatory drug treatment, reduced the predicted fine payment by over 7
percentage points. If drug treatment improved the offenders economic
condition, this improvement came after the period of supervision ended.
These results do not provide a basis for any conclusions as to the
desireability or efficacy of mandatory drug treatement. The employment
history was not statistically significant; however, the effect of
employment may have been picked up by the salary information incorporated
in the dayfine variable dummies.
One would expect that the ability to pay would decline continuously as
the number of dayfines increased. This did not happen uniformly, that is
the estimates for the dayfine categories did not become increasingly
negative as the number of dayfines increased. This pattern was followed
only by categories 1 to 4 and 8 to 9 . There is no obvious explanation why
fines in categories 5 and 6 had higher percentage payment than categories
with lower number of fines.
Among the willingness to pay variables there was an unambiguous
theoretical prediction of sign for three of them: age, race, and
educational attainment. The results conformed to the predicted signs and
all three were statistically significant. Fine payment increased with age
and educational attainment but decreased for offenders who where non-white
The two variables with an ambiguous sign prediction: prior drug conviction
I
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and a conviction for drug possession rather than drug dealing were not
statistically significant. In a sense, this conforms to the prediction
) because each variable was predicted to have different effects on payment
through different processes. These opposing effects could cancel each
other rendering the overall effect of the variable non-significant.
Enforcement effort included two variables with theoretically predicted
signs: length of supervision and prison term. Length of supervision was
measured by two dummy variables, both had the predicted positive sign and
were statistically significant. Also, the effectiveness of over 25 months
of supervision was double that of 13 to 24 months of supervision. The
prison term was negative as predicted but not statistically significant.
The type of supervision was both statistically significant and strongly
positive in effect, that is, probation supervision added 28 percentage
points to fine payment relative to parole supervision. However, the
prison variable and supervision variable results are to a degree confounded
because of the correlation between these variables was -.74. In the sample
when a probation sentence included a prison term, the term was shorter than
the average in the sample. Similarly, parole supervision is always in
conjunction with a prison sentence and the length of the prison sentence of
parolees is longer than probation prison sentences. The size of the
district drug fine case load was not statistically significant. This does
not prove the absence of a district effect on fine enforcement success;
Fmore district specific information is needed to capture any such an effect.
20
Parameter:
TABLE 3
Regression Model of Fine Enforcement Success:
Dependent Variable: PPAID - Percent of fine paid
Estimate: T Value: Variable Definition:
i
INTERCEPT 46.99 7.77
Ability to Pay:
DDAYFIN1 -9.83
DDAYFIN2 -11.55
DDAYFIN3 -16.73
DDAYFIN4 -24.21
DDAYFIN5 -19.85
DDAYFIN6 -12.99
DDAYFIN7 -32.82
DDAYFIN8 -3 0.08
DDAYFIN9 -36.55
DTREATDR -7.19
DBEGEMPL 0.98
Willingness to Pay:
AGE
DRACE
DPRDRUG
DBEGEDLV
DDROFUSE
.0.23
-13.12
0.11
6.81
1.97
Enforcement Effort:
DBIGDIST -1.12
DSUPV1 8.77
DSUPV2 15.57
DPROBAT 28.09
DPRIS -4.81
72
07
95
52
20
23
85
82
25
80
31
2.52
-6.09
0.05
2.62
0.77
-0.51
3.92
6.75
9.59
-1.77
=1 if Dayfines: 26 - 50
=1 if Dayfines: 51 - 100
=1 if Dayfines: 101 - 150
=1 if Dayfines: 151 - 200
=1 if Dayfines: 201 - 300
: 1 if Dayfines: 300 - 400
=1 if Dayfines: 401 - 500
=1 if Dayfines: 501 - 1000
=1 if Dayfines: > 1000
=1 if drug abuse treatment was reguired
: 1 if employed > 3 months in last 12 mo
Age in years when supervision began
=1 if race is non-white
=1 if one of more prior drug offenses
=1 if college graduate
=1 if drug offense was drug use only
: 1 if district had big drug case load
=1 if 13 - 24 months supervision
=1 if 25 or more months supervision
=1 if supervision type was probation
=1 if sentence included prison term
( 1,970 Observations )
«.
\
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V Conclusions:
The statistical results provide strong support — signs and statistical
significance — for the theoretical model of determinants of fine
enforcement success. However, the overall performance of the model was
modest, the equation explained only 28% of the variance of the percent of
fine paid around the sample mean of 62%. This notwithstanding, there are
some implications for policy that can drawn.
It is useful to consider from a policy perspective the results for each
of three theoretical processes which jointly determine the predicted
percent of fine paid. Two of these processes are directly controlled by
criminal justice policy. The ability to pay was primarily determined by
two variables: the number of dayfines and mandatory drug treatment. If
judges have sufficient authority in setting the monetary fine, they can
then use the offender's income to compute dayfine equivalents for any fine.
The number of dayfines can then be used to evaluate the payment prospects
of the fine before they impose it. Similarly, judges would do well to
consider whether offenders have serious drug dependency problems in using a
fine.
The other process which is directly affected by policy is enforcement
effort. The two important variables here are the length of supervision and
I
a whether a prison sentence accompanies the fine. Again these variables
are determined in the sentencing process. If an analysis of fine payment
shows a low prospect for payment, one alternative sentence would be
community service hours. This is in effect a fine paid in kind. Not only
22
is ability to pay unimportant, it is also easier to force compliance. It
is much easier to establish willful failure to perform community service A
than willful failure to pay a fine. Consequently, the threat of A
incarceration for violating the sentence is much more credible.
The last process — willingness to pay — contains variables which are
already determined at the time of arrest or sentencing. They are
determined exogenously to the criminal justice system. It is of interest
to know the relative importance of the policy controlled variables and the
willingness to pay variables in explaining the variance of fine payment in
the sample. To evaluate this importance, the equation was re-estimated
with all five of the variables measuring willingness to pay omitted. The
resulting equation explained 26% of the variation compared to 28% when all
variables where included. This insignificant drop in explanatory power
indicates that policy variables are the most important.
The primary conclusion of this study is that if fines are to be used to
replace incarceration, at least marginally, payment of the fine need not be
a barrier to this change, provided that fine sentencing takes proper
account of the relevant variables . When these variables indicate that a
fine of a size sufficient to constitute a just penalty will not be paid,
then community service or incarceration should be considered as an
alternative sentence.
1
10 See Greene, 1988, for a broad discussion of the issues relating to an
expanded use of fines.
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